The "law of one price" asserts that homogeneous goods must sell for the same price across locations and vendors. While many deviations from this "law" have been observed in the real world, it remains a useful building block in economic theory, and serves as a benchmark for empirical studies. A crucial underlying assumption used in arguing for the validity of the law is the homogeneity of goods and buyers: buyers do not care which of the goods they buy, or which seller they are buying it from, nor do sellers care about the identity of the buyers. In other words, any two instances of the good are perfect substitutes for the buyers, as are any two buyers from any seller's point of view. This paper makes the formal claim that even in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, an approximate version of the law remains valid, and the approximation improves as the market grows large.
To prove this result we use the assignment game model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) in which there is a finite set of firms and a finite set of workers, and each firm is looking to hire exactly one worker in exchange for a negotiable salary. Each firm has a (possibly different) value for hiring each of the workers, and each worker has a (possibly different) reservation value for working for each of the firms, and utilities are assumed to be linear in money. We study three different random models which generate the value:
In the independent and bounded model, we assume that this productivity is separable in the firm's quality, the worker's human capital level, and an idiosyncratic component that is independently and identically distributed according to some bounded distribution. We prove that the with high probability the differences in the payoffs of agents on the same side of the market behave like log n n , where n is the size of the market . We also prove that this bound is tight, and provide simulations. Finally, we show that when the market is unbalanced the short side takes almost all the surplus.
In the correlated bounded model, we assume that each firm has a quality, each worker has a human capital level, and a symmetric Cobb-Douglas productivity function combined (separably) with idiosyncratic noise determines the productivity from matching each worker to each firm. Again we show an approximate law of one price (where the difference in payoffs is 1/poly(n)), and provide simulations. The main theo-Full version at http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.6103. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). EC'15, June 15-19, 2015 retical tool that we use to establish this result is showing that the matching generated is approximately assortative, for the correct approximation measure. Finally, we consider a model with independent exponential idiosyncratic component and show that the differences in workers' payoffs do not vanish. Nevertheless, we do present computer simulations and a partial argument for why most agents in the same side would get similar payoffs, and why the short side gets most of the surplus.
